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Abstract: This paper examines a remarkable lawsuit in health care rationing.
The Patients Association for Interstitial Cystitis sued the Dutch National Health
Care Institute for alleged misconduct against Interstitial Cystitis patients, as the
Institute decided that bladder instillations with chondroitin sulphate or hyaluronic
acid are no longer covered by the basic health insurance. The patients’ organisation
challenged the Institute for basing its standpoint on scientific evidence; overruling
clinical expertise and patients’ experiences. While scientific advice is often solicited
in public health issues, simultaneously, the authority of scientific advice is
increasingly being questioned in the public domain. Also, the judiciary is frequently
called upon to adjudicate in rationing decisions. Based on an ethnographic study of
the National Health Care Institute, drawing on insights from the field of Science
and Technology Studies, we analyse this lawsuit as a negotiation of what
knowledge counts in reimbursement decisions.
Submitted 24 December 2015; revised 27 June 2016; accepted 27 August 2016
1. Introduction
The Netherlands was recently host to a remarkable lawsuit in health care. The
Patients’ Association for Interstitial Cystitis (ICP) sued the health care rationing body
of the Netherlands, the National Health Care Institute (hereafter ‘the Institute’), for
alleged misconduct against interstitial cystitis patients. In 2013, the Institute issued
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its authoritative standpoint that bladder instillations with chondroitin sulphate
or hyaluronic acid [see Box 1] should no longer be covered by the basic health insur-
ance. Despite the fact that patients claimed to benefit from the treatment, the Institute
concluded that there was insufficient scientific evidence supporting its effectiveness.
The patients’ organisation legally challenged the Institute for basing its standpoint on
scientific evidence, overruling clinical expertise and patient experiences.
In court, the Institute’s use of the principles of evidence-based medicine (EBM) was
disputed. The singularity of this case lies in the fact that such a ‘battle of the evidences’
is the exact opposite of what the founders of EBM had in mind. According to David
Sackett, the aim of EBM is to ‘integrate the best external evidence with individual
clinical expertise and patients’ choice’ (Sackett et al., 1996: 72; emphasis added).
The Institute’s evidence-based decision had quite the reverse effect; it led to a
momentous clash between experimental and experiential forms of knowledge.
Patients, urologists and the Institute ended up in the courtroom of Amsterdam
negotiating the appropriateness of different forms of knowledge for this decision.
Drawing on insights of the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), we
studied the legal proceedings as a collective deliberation of what type of
knowledge counts in reimbursement decisions. In court, what meaning is given
to the concepts ‘evidence’, ‘expertise’ and ‘experience’? What evidential weight is
attributed to these respective forms of knowledge? Why were the Institute’s
principles of EBM contested in this lawsuit?
This lawsuit is not an isolated case. Over the past decades, the judiciary has
increasingly been called upon to adjudicate in rationing decisions (Syrett, 2013).
Increased litigation has been attributed to a waning deference to medical judgement,
more explicit rationing strategies, a more rights-conscious citizenry and the rise of
patient support organisations (Syrett, 2013: 1). Health care rationing institutes find
themselves on shifting ground. They have to come to terms with the declining
authority of science, a growing recognition and involvement of patients in policy
decisions (Wait andNolte, 2006;Moreira, 2011) and increased judiciary interference
(Syrett, 2013; Wang, 2013; Morales, 2015). These are delicate issues for knowledge
Box 1. Bladder instillations
Bladder instillations are a medical treatment used for various bladder conditions,
e.g. bladder cancer, interstitial cystitis, painful bladder syndrome. Bladder
instillations are a common procedure for urologists and patients can even do the
procedure independently in a home setting. During treatment a fine tube (catheter)
is inserted into the bladder. The bladder is then filled with a solution, including a
pharmacological cocktail of e.g. chondroitin sulphate or hyaluronic acid.
The solution remains inside for a period of time (30 minutes to two hours) and
is then drained.
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institutions whose authority, legitimacy and very raison d’être lay, originally, in their
acknowledged expertise as a basis for policy decisions. With this analysis, we aim to
gain insight into the way in which court cases help rationing bodies like the National
Health Care Institute to reflect on their epistemic conventions and – ultimately – to
work towards more socially robust rationing decisions.
2. Theorising knowledge disputes
Health care rationing decisions frequently trigger heated discussions in the media
and politics. It is commonly assumed that scientific evidence provides the factual,
medical–technical and non-political base for such thorny, moral decisions.
Yet, STS scholars have shown that there is no given distinction between fact and
value (e.g. Latour, 1993) or between objective knowledge and subjective ideas
(e.g. Daston and Galison, 1992). Rather, such distinctions are ‘man-made’. What
we currently accept as valid knowledge claim results from a collective human
endeavour that is contingent to our political and socio-historical setting.
In contemporary knowledge societies, scientific knowledge has become an
integral element of politics and governance. At the same time, the authority of
scientific advice is being challenged more frequently in the public domain (Bijker
et al., 2009; Horstman, 2014). As knowledge has come to play a more central
part in health care governance, the question of whose knowledge counts for such
decisions seems to have become politically and morally charged (cf. Moreira,
2012). Some scholars have found that the processes of scientification of public
policy often go together with processes of politicisation of scientific knowledge
(Hoppe, 1999; Weingart, 1999). We regard the lawsuit on bladder instillations as
one of those politicisations of scientific knowledge.
3. Methods
This paper is the product of ongoing ethnographic research into ‘how knowing is
done’ (de Laet, 2012: 429) being carried out at the National Health Care Institute,
a central governing body in Dutch health care. It is within this research context
that bladder instillations emerged as a prominent case, exemplary of the Institute’s
‘real life’ struggles. Knorr-Cetina introduced the notion of ‘epistemic culture’
that refers to the historically, politically and socially grounded practices of
creating and warranting knowledge (Knorr-Cetina, 1999, 2007). Every place
that produces knowledge claims, be it a laboratory or a knowledge institute, is
host to a set of ‘practices, arrangements and mechanisms’ which – in that area of
professional expertise – make up ‘how we know what we know’ (Knorr-Cetina,
2007: 363). The Institute too is governed by such knowledge routines.
The first author collected empirical data through direct observation, in-depth
conversations and document analysis between October 2013 and October 2015.
The Institute’s management provided her with an in-house desk (attended one to
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three days a week), and access to archives. During two years of fieldwork, the first
author attended public and closed meetings of internal working groups (weekly), the
Institute’s Executive Board (two-weekly), as well as expert meetings of advising
committees (Package Advisory Committee, Health Care Quality Committee,
Scientific Advisory Committee, Health Care Professions Committee), staff fora and
informal lunches. She recorded the ‘practices of knowing’ at the Institute in detailed
field notes: what types of studies or expertise are selected in decision-making
processes? What preferences exist with regard to methods or disciplines? What are
the shared beliefs regarding what a credible knowledge claim looks like?
A few days into the fieldwork, on 18 October 2013, a staff member with many
years’ experience referred to the issue of bladder instillations as ‘a hot potato’
(notes#18102013-24). Following this lead, the first author familiarised herself with
the case in five in-depth conversations with the staff members involved. With the
lawsuit pending, these conversations were replete with references to documents:
research papers, journal articles, policy documents and procedural manuals in
support of the Institute’s standpoint. At least as many references were made to the
letters of complaint, studies, expert opinions and testimonials brought forward by the
plaintiff, the ICP. Necessarily, we delved into the Institute’s archives to retrieve all
documents on the case and searched PubMed for the journal articles and medical
guidelines cited. The following response to a request for an interview illustrates the
informational weight these documents had for staff members: what do you want?
‘just a little chat about it? [or] the documents?’ (notes#28102013). Legal records,
policy and research papers, internal emails, memos, letters and testimonials were
crucial informants in understanding the specificities of the case. Documents
did indeed prove to be the prominent ‘artefacts’ of modern knowledge practices
(Riles, 2006). In this paper, we cite many such documents, as they possess the
conciseness necessary to depict this knowledge dispute satisfactorily.
We closely followed the lawsuit from the writ of summons in summary
proceedings on 4 December 2013, until the judicial verdict in proceedings on
merits on 19 November 2014. The staff members involved (both policy advisors
and legal staff) kept us informed and we carried on tracking the paper trail and
attended board meetings and meetings of advisory committees addressing the
issue. Two years of ethnographic fieldwork permitted not only a close study of the
case, but also of its impact on the Institute: the worries, doubts and reflexivity it
brought with it. Being present enabled us to observe the Institute’s continuing
struggle to reconcile the unambiguous formal rationality of EBM with the
‘messiness’ of case-based practical rationality (Jenkings and Barber, 2004: 1765;
Gkeredakis et al., 2011; Russell and Greenhalgh, 2012, 2014) and the inevitable
lack of evidence they often have to grapple with in making rationing decisions.
All authors engaged in an iterative process of (joint) close reading of field notes
and legal documents. Sensitised by the literature on EBM and its commentaries
(e.g. Sackett et al., 1996; Petticrew and Roberts, 2003; Booth, 2010; Greenhalgh
et al., 2014; Parkhurst and Abeysinghe, 2014; Greenhalgh et al., 2015), we
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progressively focussed on three different forms of knowledge: experimental
evidence, clinical expertise and patient experience. We culled from the data any
written or verbal statement on the truthfulness, usefulness and significance of
these forms of knowledge. In our analysis of the legal proceedings, we focussed on
the deliberations of weighing up these respective forms of knowledge against one
another. As a ‘member-check’, we discussed our analysis in staff fora, a general
board meeting, and with a research team at the Institute.
Working from an STS perspective, we abstained from making any claims
about the truthfulness, usefulness or political significance of particular forms
of knowledge. Similarly, we make no claims about the appropriateness of the
principles of EBM for rationing decisions. It is only by refraining from taking a
stand of our own that we can conduct a systematic research into the way other
parties give meaning to the notions of ‘evidence’, ‘expertise’ or ‘experience’.
By studying how others weigh these respective forms of knowledge and evaluate
the appropriateness of the principles of EBM, we aim to learn what is currently
required in substantiating and legitimating rationing decisions.
4. Towards evidence-based health care rationing (1965–2006)
The Netherlands has standard basic health insurance for all citizens provided
by private health insurance companies. The 2006 Health Insurance Act
(Zorgverzekeringswet, Zvw) obliges everybody who resides – or pays payroll
tax – in the Netherlands to take out basic health care insurance from a private
insurance company. These private insurance companies are expected to negotiate the
prices, services, and quality of care on behalf of their insured clients (Van de Ven
and Schut, 2008: 779). The market is heavily regulated (Leiber et al., 2015). Income-
related subsidies make basic health care insurance affordable for all citizens. A risk
adjustment scheme compensates insurance companies for clients with predictably
high medical expenses (Van de Ven and Schut, 2009). Benefits covered from basic
insurance policy are broadly indicated by law (Zvw art. 10). The Minister of Health
formally requests advice from the Institute to specify the medical–technical content of
care that can be reimbursed from the basic health insurance. The Institute is asked
to take a standpoint in cases lacking clarity about the reimbursement of specific
treatments orwhere there is discord in the field. These standpoints are authoritative in
the field. It is in this capacity that the Institute published a negative standpoint in
2013, stating that bladder instillations with chondroitin sulphate or hyaluronic acid
were not eligible for reimbursement from the basic health insurance (CVZ [Dutch
Health Care Insurance Board]1, 2013a).
In reaching this reimbursement decision, the Institute applied the principles
of EBM. The way reimbursement decisions are made in the Netherlands
developed over time. As long ago as 1965, the Dutch Sickness Funds Act
1 As of 1 April 2014, the Dutch Health Care Insurance Board (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, CVZ),
became the National Health Care Institute (Zorginstituut Nederland).
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(Ziekenfondswet, Zfw) determined that, for a medical treatment to be reimbursed
from public funds, it must be considered ‘customary’ by the medical professional
community:
care provided by medical specialists, as referred to in article 8, para. 1, under a, of the
Sickness Fund Act, includes medical, surgical and obstetric care that is determined, in
scope, by what is common practice in the professional community (Benefits in Kind
(Sickness Fund) Decree, art.8, emphasis added)
From the late 1970s, this so-called ‘common practice criterion’ was much
debated within the context of Dutch health care legislation (Van Donk and Tus-
schenbroek, 2005; DeGroot, 2006). Over a period of four decades, the 1965-criterion
was reinterpreted and reformed by jurisprudence of the Central Appeals Tribunal
(CRvB) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). First, in the 1979 Acupuncture
arrest, the CRvB ruled that ‘common practice’ should be interpreted as the ‘attitude
within the profession of medical science and medical practice’ (21 December 1979).
Later, the ECJ further developed the interpretation of ‘common practice’ in its 2001
ruling in the Smits-Peerbooms arrest. The court decided that ‘common practice’
could not be interpreted as ‘current perceptions among Dutch professionals’, but as
care which ‘has been deemed sufficiently tried and tested in the international world
of medical science’ (ECJ 2001, C-157/99). When the Health Insurance Act
was implemented in 2006, the much criticised criterion of ‘common practice’
was replaced by a criterion that covered the overtones of the CRvB and ECJ
jurisprudence:
The content and range of the forms of care or health services are in part determined by
established medical science and medical practice and, where there is no such criterion, by
what is regarded in the relevant professional field as responsible and adequate care and
services (Health Insurance Decree (Besluit Zorgverzekeringen, Bzv art. 2.1, emphasis added))
This new criterion was an answer to national and European litigation, and to a
general call for EBM in the health care sector itself. Legal staff at the Institute had
interpreted the ECJ’s 2001 ruling as follows: ‘the court of appeal seems to be referring
here to what is actually known as “evidence-basedmedicine”’ (internal memo 2006).
Starting in the 1970s, EBM gained strong traction in clinical practice and policy
rooms, amid growing recognition of ‘the vagaries of clinical experience’ (Armstrong,
2002: 1772) and the inadequacies of knowledge based on personal experience alone.
EBM emphasised the use of external, experimental evidence in medical decision
making. The randomised-controlled trial (RCT) was seen as the ‘gold standard’ for
determining the efficacy of a treatment: evaluating the impact ofmedical interventions
on groups rather than on individuals and through controlled, experimental rather
than observational design. The 2006 criterion shows that, in reimbursement policy
too, there was a move away from confidence in knowledge based on doctor–patient
interactions and their ‘common treatment practices’ (art.8, Sickness Fund Act) and a
move towards the new evidence-based paradigm.
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Since the introduction of the 2006 Health Insurance Act, the Institute has used
the principles of EBM ‘in order to determine whether care complies with
the established medical science and medical practice criterion’ (CVZ, 2007). The
EBM method currently functions as a tool for validating and weighing
medical knowledge from bothmedical practice and science. It does this, by placing
different forms of medical knowledge in a hierarchy2:
A1) systematic review of at least two A2 level studies carried out independently of one
another;
A2) good quality and sufficiently large randomised double-blind, comparative clinical
research (RCT);
B) comparative research, but without all the characteristics of A2;
C) non-comparative research;
D) ‘experts’ opinions (CVZ, 2007: 8–9)
The status of evidence within this hierarchy is based on the level of rigorousness in
study design to reduce susceptibility to bias. The Institute selects medical-scientific
information (scientific articles, medical guidelines, etc.) and ranks it according to its
evidential value (level of evidence A1 to D). The ‘cardinal principle of Evidence-based
Medicine is that strong evidence supersedes weaker evidence’ (CVZ, 2007: 8-9). The
RCT and the systematic review form the apex of this hierarchical order. For positive
reimbursement advice, the Institute requires at least one systematic review (A1-level) or
two RCTs (A2-level) that show unambiguously positive results about the therapeutic
effect of the treatment. As systematic reviews and RCTs are not always available or
feasible, the Institute may accept lower levels of evidence in decisionmaking. This may
be the case if (double-) blind research is impossible, if the disorder is very rare, or if
starting an RCT is no longer viable (because the treatment is a long-standing practice
or endorsed by strong international consensus).
The EBMmethod offers the Institute a general procedure for weighing different
forms of evidence and negotiating compatibilities between them. According to the
Institute, the EBM method facilitates the ‘meticulous, explicit and judicious use
of the current best evidence’ for reimbursement decisions (CVZ, 2007). From an
STS perspective, we could say that the EBM hierarchy provides the Institute with
a ‘logic of knowledge consumption’ (Knorr-Cetina, 2007: 368). The Institute
implemented EBM as -to use the phrase coined by Knorr-Cetina- ‘epistemic
machinery’ (1999): a working method, technique or tool of knowing. This does
not mean that the formal rationality of EBM is always this clear-cut when used in
the practice of decision making. As a staff member commented:
The difficulty [is] that often no good RCTs are available. You often have to be satisfied
with ‘lower evidence’. There is a ‘check-list of appropriate evidence’ […] it lists all the
2 Following national consensus on evidence-based guidelines, the Institute adopted the EBROhierarchy
of evidence (Evidence-Based Guidelines developed by the Institute for Health Care Improvement (CBO)).
Similar hierarchies are used by affiliated health care rationing institutes, such as the BritishNational Institute
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE).
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reasons for diverging from higher evidence. But every case is still difficult. Every case is
different and presents its own problems (notes#31102013)
In the case of bladder instillations, the staff members involved actually thought
‘last year we were starting on a clear-cut case, but it turned out to be fairly
complicated’ (notes#31102013).
5. Contested evidence
In 2011, an increase in the prices of three specific brands of bladder instillations
(Uracyst, Cystistat, Gepan) attracted the attention of insurance companies.
Confronted with increased costs, insurance companies started asking questions
about the added value of bladder instillations with chondroitin sulphate or
hyaluronic acid (0.9% NaCL). The Institute was asked for a standpoint on
the issue. The Institute’s decision-making process started with a literature search.
They searched for experimental evidence from double-blind and placebo-
controlled RCTs. This is why:
As interstitial cystitis is a disorder that is characterised by a fluctuating course and there is
no standard treatment, randomised studies are needed in which bladder instillation with
washes containing chondroitin sulphate and/or hyaluronic acid is compared with placebo
washes. As the symptoms and outcome parameters are subjective, double-blind studies
are preferred (CVZ, 2013a: 10).
Double-blind and placebo-controlled RCTs keep both patient and doctor in the
dark about the treatment received. In EBM, it is generally felt that such an
experimental design curtails a possibly biased cognition and facilitates a more
‘objective’ measurement of the treatment effect.
The Institute consulted two databases, Cochrane Library and MEDLINE,
specialised in biomedical literature, RCTs and systematic reviews. Two double-
blind RCTs (A2-level evidence) were selected and a prospective comparative
study (B-level evidence). The selected RCTs (Nickel et al., 2012, 2010)
showed improvements after treatment with bladder instillations with chondroitin
sulphate or hyaluronic acid, but the difference with the placebo group was not
statistically significant. The prospective comparative study (Shao et al., 2010)
showed statistically significant improvements (in micturition, Visual Analogue
Scale (VAS) pain score and bladder capacity), but these were not statistically tested
between the groups and the study was of low quality (CVZ, 2013a: 11). The
Institute also consulted international guidelines and reimbursement standpoints.
In four international guidelines and an (outdated) standpoint of the Canadian
Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health, treatments with bladder instilla-
tions were either not mentioned, or had a low level of recommendation due to
inconclusive evidence (CVZ, 2013a: 13). From these findings, the Institute
concluded that there was insufficient evidence of the effect of this treatment to
arrive at a positive reimbursement standpoint.
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Before publication, the Institute invited the Dutch Urological Association
(NVU) to comment on the findings. The NVU did not contest that ‘the outcomes
[…] show that at the moment there is insufficient reliable research that provides
evidence of the effect of the said washes in the indication fields mentioned’
(excerpt from email). The NVU did, however, express some doubt about the
conclusiveness of the experimental evidence:
By the way, this does NOT prove that the washes are NOT effective, which can be
confirmed, based on the experience of urologists who frequently use the said washes
(CVZ, 2013a: 21).
The Institute, however, required positive proof of efficacy in order to include a
treatment in the basic package: ‘care must above all be effective. This demands
evidence showing that care does what it is meant to do’ (National Health
Care Institute, 2014). Note that this requirement conflates situations where there
is definitive evidence of no treatment effect, with situations where there is
no conclusive evidence of a treatment effect. The only way towards a positive
reimbursement decision would be conclusive proof of the treatment’s effective-
ness. That is why the Institute – despite the NVU’s reservations – had to conclude
that bladder instillations with chondroitin sulphate or hyaluronic acid did not
fulfil the ‘established medical science and medical practice’ criterion as ‘the
existing evidence is insufficient for attributing a possible effect of using intravesical
treatment with chondroitin sulphate and/or hyaluronic acid to treat interstitial
cystitis’ (CVZ, 2013a: 19). One staff member noted: ‘if new positive studies are
published, [the Institute] can revise their standpoint’ (email#16122013). But for
the time being the matter had been settled. In July 2013 the Institute published its
standpoint that bladder instillations with chondroitin sulphate and/or hyaluronic
acid would no longer be covered by the basic health insurance.
Soon after this, the Dutch Urological Association (NVU) and the Patients’
Association for Interstitial Cystitis (ICP) took up battle positions against the
Institute. First, in a letter to the Institute, the NVU held an earnest plea for continued
reimbursement of the instillations. The NVU mentioned the tremendous diversity in
the manifestation of interstitial cystitis (IC), the groups of patients, the pathophy-
siology and the diagnostic findings. Different treatment plans are available for IC
(e.g. bladder instillations, antibiotics, painkillers, neuroleptics, neuromodulation,
botuine-toxine-A injections and cystectomy with urine deviation), and yet ‘the var-
ious different complaints relating to interstitial cystitis are extremely persistent and
difficult to treat’ (letter from the NVU). The NVU argued that:
In practice of state-of-the-art clinics that treat patients with IC, this means it is not pos-
sible to produce such hard scientific evidence to show which treatments work and which
do not. Large series are impossible due to the diversity of the groups of patients
and the way in which IC presents, which means that hard evidence will never be
supplied. These patients need customised treatment and in the opinion of the experts these
bladder fluids are indispensable (letter from the NVU).
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Can this complex disorder be adequately captured by an experimental
research design? Can the results of the two RCTs (with sample populations of
respectively 65 and 98 people) be projected onto the entire population of IC
patients? The Institute acknowledged the difficulty of the issue. One of the
scientific advisors to the Institute would later put it as follows: ‘It is increasingly
difficult to be able to say in general whether something does or doesn’t work… It
depends increasingly on how well you define the target group’ (notes#10022014).
Together, the NVU and the Institute decided that ‘the best option would
be to attempt to identify, based on the existing studies, a subgroup that
would benefit from the instillations’ (email#14012014). On the basis of such a
subgroup analysis, the Institute may decide to reimburse the washes for
specific groups of IC patients, for example patients that show Hunner’s
lesions. However, after reviewing the issue, the Institute’s staff concluded that
‘based on the literature […], there is a vague idea that a subgroup exists, but
identifying the subgroup is still not possible’ (email#14012014). In the end, it was
left to the NVU to come up with a guideline and specified treatment protocol
for (different groups of) IC patients. The Institute suggested that, if such a
guideline contained an ‘extremely accurate description of the indication and the
expertise required of the urologist’, the Institute might decide that ‘no RCTs will
be necessary for such a limited group, as we can regard a lower level of evidence as
acceptable’ (email#140102014). To this day, however, such a guideline has not
been made.
The ICP, too, wrote a letter to the Institute in which it lodged a notice of
objection. ‘You were wrong’, the ICP wrote to the Institute, ‘not to take into
account in the report – or insufficiently – the opinion of the professional group,
which is that this is a case of responsible and adequate care’ (letter from the ICP).
This issue was deliberated in court (we will address this issue later). The letter also
included several testimonials in which patients claimed that bladder instillations
with chondroitin sulphate or hyaluronic acid were less invasive and less painful
compared to regular washes without this pharmaceutical cocktail. One of the
testimonials read:
The effects of GEPAN can clearly be observed. After bladder instillation washes, the
frequency of urination is considerably reduced and nocturnal frequency is also reduced.
Furthermore, and naturally because of this, one can also speak of a greatly reduced urge
and pain (exhibit 17).
Though the Institute never actually denied that individual IC patients
might benefit from a treatment with bladder instillations, they did not take patient
testimonials into account. A staff member explained:
The fact that individual patients claim to benefit from the treatment is not sufficient to
conclude that the treatment complies with ‘established medical science and medical
practice’. [The Institute] does not issue statements about and on behalf of individual
patients (email#16122013).
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The Institute needed RCTs. Apart from the testimonials, the ICP presented new
publications from 2013 showing that patients benefitted from washes with
chondroitin sulphate and/or hyaluronic acid. The Institute did decide to review
those publications. In an updated standpoint, published at the end of November
2013, they wrote:
Due to a letter of objection from the Patients’ Association for Interstitual Cystitis, a
supplementary literature search was carried out for studies dated from November 2012
up to and incl. 27 November 2013. No new randomised studies were found (CVZ,
2013b: 11).
The Institute did find a meta-analysis of a non-comparative study by Nickel
et al. (2008) and the two earlier mentioned RCTs by Nickel et al. (2010, 2012) in
which: the ‘pooling of these 3 studies revealed that bladder instillation with
chondroitin sulphate for interstitial cystitis is effective’ (2013b: 9). However,
the Institute concluded that ‘the way this meta-analysis was carried out was
methodologically incorrect, because the studies differ from the study set-up, which
resulted in a distortion of the results’ (CVZ, 2013b: 11). So the updated
standpoint conveyed the same message as before: that the existing evidence
was insufficient for attributing a possible effect to bladder instillations with
chondroitin sulphate and/or hyaluronic acid and the washes would no longer be
covered by the basic health insurance. Staff at the Institute recalled that:
the studies and patient case histories supplied by the ICP did not form a reason for [the
Institute] to alter its current standpoint. We confirmed this on 26 November 2013 in a
letter to the ICP. […] On 4 December the ICP summoned [the Institute] to appear in
summary proceedings (internal memo#07012014).
The legal proceedings started with summary proceedings (ECLI:NL:
RBAMS:2014:66) and were followed by proceedings on the merits (ECLI:NL:
RBAMS:2014:7727).
6. Legal proceedings
The lawyer of the ICP stated before the court:
I do not contradict that the efficacy of a treatment is a prerequisite for being eligible for
inclusion in the insured benefits package. I only contradict that this efficacy has
to be proved according to the EBM method […], I feel that the element of ‘practice’ is
insufficiently accounted for in the EBMmethod […] What everyday practice thinks about
something has too little evidential value in the EBM method (hearing#30042014)
According to the lawyer of the ICP, clinical practice is given too little weight in the
EBM method and the Institute’s standpoint – wrongfully – relied predominantly
on RCT-level evidence. The ICP presented a declaration signed by 84 urologists
(of the 432 urologists registered with the Royal Dutch Medical Association
(KNMG) at that time), claiming that consensus exists amongst urologists that the
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bladder instillations are effective for some patients. She referred to an article by
the founders of EBM (stressing that external evidence alone is never enough, nor is
solely clinical expertise, both are essential for medical decision making
(Sackett et al., 1996)) to claim that knowledge from ‘everyday medical practice
should be placed on the same level as other forms of evidence’ (hearing#30042014).
In response to the urologists’ declaration, the Institute argued that in this case
2 RCTs were available; ‘at such time that such scientific literature is available, the
opinions of experts are in fact no longer relevant (strong evidence replaces weaker
evidence)’ (email#17122013). The chairman of the Institute’s Scientific Advice
Committee explained further: ‘The EBM method uses not only RCTs […]; this
form of research is required in particular for those treatments of which we have
reasonable doubt about their efficacy’ (hearing#30042014). In the case of bladder
instillations, there was such a considerable doubt. A staff member explained:
Some of the patients have a functional syndrome… and these are subjective outcome
measures that you examine, i.e., improvement or reduction in symptoms. We were
therefore explicit in saying ‘wewant randomised studies and not case series because… the
placebo group also had a large response’ (notes#03032014).
Weighing the evidential value of clinical expertise against that of RCTs, the judge
was of the opinion that the Institute provided grounds showing that, in this case, there
was indeed ‘a need of double-blind, controlled research in order to objectively
substantiate the experience of doctors’ (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:7727). Hence, in the
judicial verdict on 19 November 2014, the court found it was:
justified that, despite the importance of practice experience of doctors – which is
acknowledged by the Institute – this is of less consequence than the results of double-
blind, controlled studies (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:7727, emphasis added).
The two RCTs by Nickel et al., however, did not remain undisputed in court. In
the original standpoint, the Institute stated that: ‘both studies included patients
numbers of, respectively 65 and 98 patients, and were under-powered. The
duration of follow-up was short’ (2013a: 15). In the course of the lawsuit,
the Institute invited an independent research institute (ME-TA) to review the
literature using a new EBM method: Grading of Recommendations Assessment,
Development and Evaluation (GRADE). GRADE is presented as an innovative
EBMmethod in which the hierarchy of evidence is maintained, yet evidence can be
upgraded or downgraded according to its (methodological) quality. The method
increases the flexibility of the traditional hierarchy. The GRADE method is
regarded as a transparent, explicit and systematic method for weighing evidence
not only according to the rigorousness of the study design, but also the quality of
that evidence (e.g. Guyatt et al., 2011). ME-TA’s application of the GRADE
method to the literature led to the downgrading of RCTs due to quality
considerations (underpowered, inadequate duration of follow-up). However,
none of the other forms of evidence were upgraded. Working from the cardinal
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principle that strong evidence supersedes weaker evidence, the RCTs still
superseded other forms of knowledge available. The GRADEmethod did not alter
the Institute’s conclusions. The judicial verdict read:
The conclusion of this [GRADE] study is also that the existing evidence is insufficient to be
able to attribute a possible effect to the treatment with these bladder instillation products […]
Therefore, insofar as it could already be said that the Institute did not make use of the most
advancedmethod for assessing care against [establishedmedical science andmedical practice]
to arrive at its [initial] standpoint on 23 July 2013, this may remain without consequences, as
the newer method did not lead to any different result (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:7727).
After all, the evidential value of RCTs – despite serious quality considerations –was
considered to be higher than the evidential value of clinical expertise.
In what follows, we focus on deliberations weighing patient experiences against
RCTs. In court, the ICP reproached the Institute for failing to consult patients’
organisations in its standpoint. The ICP stated that it ‘was never involved in the
Institute’s research. We were only informed after the standpoint had already been
determined’ (hearing#30042014). According to the ICP, this was a breach with the
‘due care principle’ in policymaking. In its defence, the Institute claimed that it is
standard procedure to consult professional associations of medical specialists (in this
case the NVU), but not necessarily patients’ organisations. The Institute takes into
account the ‘specific circumstances and interests of the group of patients’ only when
there are questions about the feasibility of scientific research or if ‘it is necessary to be
satisfied with a lower level of ‘evidence’. This is […] not the case here’ (statement of
defence). The Institute explained that in this case ‘two RCTs had been carried out,
proving that it is possible to carry out a double-blind RCT involving this disorder’
(statement of defence). As RCTs were available, they took precedence over patient
preferences and testimonials for this reimbursement decision. The Institute claimed:
specifically because this involves a heterogeneous group of patients, it is necessary to carry
out research among subgroup of patients in order to demonstrate that the treatment is
effective for specific groups of patients. The Institute has always maintained that, when
such research becomes available, a new assessment can take place that may result in a
different opinion (statement of defence).
During the legal proceedings, the ICP presented journal articles and abstracts
of promising studies. It made no difference, however, as none of these studies
matched the evidential power that was attributed to the two RCTs used in the
Institute’s standpoint. All in all, the judge ruled that:
In the opinion of the court, it is irrelevant whether failing to consult the patients’ association is
incompatible with the due care principle, as it has been established that the information that
the ICP could have supplied – and which has been supplied during these proceedings – did
not lead to a different assessment (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:7727, emphasis added).
Furthermore, the ICP noted that ‘no attention whatsoever was given to “soft
principles”, such as quality of life, patient satisfaction and the experience of
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patients and care providers’ (hearing#30042014). According to the Institute,
however, individual patient preferences do not play any significant role in
collective coverage decisions (CVZ, 2007: 10). A director at the Institute pointed
out the reason why RCTs are valued over patient preferences:
the use of non-personal statistical data on a group level makes it possible to weigh up the
personal interests of one group of patients against those of another group of patients.
Every euro that you spend on bladder instillation liquids is no longer available
for spending on care for elderly persons suffering from dementia, to name just
one… (notes#25062015)
For health economic purposes, RCTs permit a meta-assessment of health
benefits between different treatments. The use of RCTs and systematic reviews
enables one to calculate the expected gain from different treatments, thus facil-
itating a choosing between them. One of the board members explained that the
Institute always has to consider the limited public funds available and is tasked to
ensure ‘that the general public, who pay the premiums, are paying for something
that is worthwhile’ (notes#30062015). Without evidence of the effectiveness of a
treatment, the government could be paying for care that is actually ineffective
or – in a worst case scenario – is facilitating care that might be doing more harm
than good. In the end, the court decided, based on the same line of reasoning, that:
It is the intention of the legislator to confine the basic benefits package to those forms of care
that can be trusted to be effective. This is to be tested against ‘established medical science and
medical practice’. Whether care satisfies this legal criterion must be determined as objectively
as possible. In the opinion of the court, the Institute has given – with its selected method
[EBM] – a correct application of this criterion (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:7727)
7. Discussion
In this article, we showed how and why the Institute reached a negative reimburse-
ment decision with regard to bladder instillations with chondroitin sulphate or
hyaluronic acid for the treatment of IC. Our analysis of the decision-making process
showed the tension between EBM’s formal logic and its practical rationality: the
struggle to be accountable to both ‘good’ EBMand local contingencies (Jenkings and
Barber, 2004: 1765). The opinions of clinical experts and patients’ experiences
with the treatment, though positive, were considered unreliable due to subjective
symptoms and outcome measures and a known risk of placebo effect. The RCTs
were underpowered, inadequate with regard to duration of follow-up and
performed on a problematically heterogeneous population. The trials did detect
some positive effect of the treatment, but the effect was not statistically significant.
This could be due to the fact that the treatment simply did not work, but the lack of
statistical significance could also be due to the fact that it was an underpowered trial.
(It is still plausible that the treatment actually worked, but the RCTs were too small
to reveal this.) Ultimately, the Institute concluded that there was ‘insufficient
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evidence’: there was no proof that the washes were effective, nor was there any
conclusive evidence that they were not. Actually, reimbursement decisions are
frequently associated with uncertainty, as data on effectiveness, safety, etc. are
seldom complete (Boon et al., 2015). Nonetheless, an occupational burden rests on
the Institute to take a standpoint, despite this lack of certainty. In line with its general
policy, the Institute concluded that without conclusive evidence of its effectiveness,
the treatment cannot be reimbursed from public funds.
In court, patients and urologists challenged the appropriateness of the EBM
method for making this decision. Before the judge, patients, urologists and policy
makers negotiated whether either experimental knowledge from RCTs or
experiential knowledge from the clinic ought to play a role in this reimbursement
decision. How did a method, aimed at integrating experimental evidence, clinical
expertise and patient experiences result instead in a lawsuit in which these
forms of knowledge were weighed against one another? The lawsuit on bladder
instillations highlights a paradox in EBM’s success in both clinical practice
and policy rooms. Originally, EBM aimed at an integrative assessment of the best
external evidence with individual clinical expertise and patients’ choice for
decision making in the clinic (Sackett et al., 1996: 72). In the 1990s EBM also
gained strong traction in policy-making circles. Making an integrative assessment
for a national, stringent reimbursement decision in a policy room, however,
means that such an assessment can no longer take place at individual case-level
in the clinic. A negative reimbursement decision, unavoidably, means less
discretionary room for professionals and patients, as a treatment is simply no
longer (financially) available. This is how an evidence-based policy decision
can, paradoxically, inhibit evidence-based decision making in clinical
practice. In line with this, several authors have urged caution in the transportation
of the EBM hierarchy from clinical medicine to the realm of policy making
(Petticrew and Roberts, 2003; Booth, 2010; Parkhurst and Abeysinghe, 2014).
Nonetheless, the court ruled that, with the EBM method, the Institute had
given a correct application of the criterion of ‘established medical science and
medical practice’.
Studies have shown that the judiciary has long been reluctant to interfere in
rationing decisions and has only recently evinced greater willingness to do so
(Syrett, 2013; Wang, 2013; Morales, 2015). When they do ‘courts are not
normally empowered to substitute their view of the correct decision for that
of the original decision maker, but only to ensure that the agency has the
lawful authority to take the decision in question and that it complies with
principles of procedural fairness’ (Syrett, 2013: 7). In line with this, the Dutch
court ruled ‘procedural fairness’ in case of the Institute’s negative reimbursement
decision. As an inevitable performative effect, the verdict also ratified the
principles of EBM, the idea that ‘objectivity’ is obtained through experimental
research, and that the value of an RCT exceeds that of other forms of
knowledge.
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The ICP and NVU challenged the evidential value of RCTs and of EBM’s
epistemic propriety, but to no avail. Their objections, however, resonate with the
general critique on RCTs that a ‘patient’s unique and complex predicament is
poorly served by applying a recommendation derived […] from an average result
in a select population sample’ (Greenhalgh, 2002: 396). It seems that this holds
especially true for RCTs performed on heterogeneous populations. IC is not a
single condition. It is a term used in clinical practice to refer to a ‘spectrum of
urological symptoms’ with different underlying causes (often unknown) (Offiah
et al., 2013: 1243). Those suffering from it are likely to respond differently to
treatment (Nordling et al., 2012; Offiah et al., 2013). For this reason, the ICP
and NVU criticised the adequacy of RCTs as a means to gauge the effect of IC
treatments. Acknowledging the issue, the Institute insisted throughout the lawsuit
that if new subgroup studies were to become available, they could eventually
reconsider their standpoint for specific groups of IC patients with proven benefit
from this treatment. Yet, with the suspicions that rests on functional disorders and
placebo-sensitive treatments, how viable is it that such studies will actually be
taken up by the medical community? A scientific advisory member to the Institute
remarked: ‘euhm, who would want to carry out an RCT involving something that
doesn’t work?’ (notes#30302014). The invitation to conduct multiple trials on
sub-populations might be hypothetically rigorous, but it is often practically
unrealistic. This type of practical consideration, however, was dismissed in court.
In court, the question of procedural fairness was largely conflated with the issue of
doing ‘epistemic’ justice (Fricker, 2007). This term refers to justice in a way that all
parties are duly recognised ‘in their capacity as knower’ and have a fair share of our
‘collective interpretative resources’ at hand in order to manifest what they know
(Fricker, 2007: 1). Some scholars have warned that the principles of EBMare actually
biased against patients (Greenhalgh et al., 2015) and that patients are easily and often
‘epistemically marginalised’ in the bureaucracy of health care systems (Carel and
Kidd, 2014: 530). For example, most clinical research has ‘minimal patient input’,
which often entails that studies reflect the outcomes that matter to researchers, rather
than those that matter to patients (Greenhalgh et al., 2015: 2; Wiering et al., 2016).
Furthermore, greatly reduced levels of credibility are assigned to patient testimonies
(Carel and Kidd, 2014) and EBM’s hierarchy of evidence in particular tends to
‘devalue patient experiences’ (Greenhalgh et al., 2015: 3). Those who are familiar
with the clinical picture of functional disorders will recognise that this holds especially
true for patients suffering from medically unexplained physical symptoms like (some
cases of) IC, fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome, etc. This is also a group of
patients with the least investigative resources at their disposal to make sense of their
experiences (cf. Fricker, 2007). As mentioned earlier, IC and its treatment do not
easily attract research attention or funds, in contrast to, for example, breast cancer.
This means that IC patients are often left at the mercy of a few dedicated experts
(see Shao et al., 2010). These are the ‘epistemic margins’ from which these patients
have to argue their case: a highly reduced credibility and few entry points or resources
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to generate the required experimental evidence. This raises the question of what
‘procedual fairness’ signifies, if those who are subdued to these equal procedures have
such unequal epistemic means at their disposal?
Lawsuits add to valuable learning processes (Syrett, 2013) and it seems that
most of the learning is done outside the courtroom. Being at the Institute allowed
us to witness the ‘tinkering’ done to improve EBM’s principles for the practice of
rationing decisions. As Russell et al. (2011: 2) noted, the rationing debate has long
moved away from ‘early naive faith’ in the ability of EBM to straightforwardly
guide us in complex rationing decisions. Since 2012, the Institute has
been experimenting with conditional reimbursements, by nevertheless including
treatments that do not fulfil the legal criterion of ‘established medical science
and medical practice’ – for a specific period of time – into the insured package.
This is subject to the condition that during that period data are collected on the
efficacy of the care (CVZ, 2012; Boon et al., 2015). Aware of the shortfalls of
EBM’s strict hierarchy, the Institute started implementing GRADE, a method
that allows more flexibility within the original hierarchy and makes it possible
to include patient panels in decision-making processes. Furthermore, the
Institute now consults patient organisations more systematically in connection
with rationing decisions. Together with the Institute for Medical Technology
Assessment, the Institute drew up an ‘appropriate evidence’ questionnaire:
a guide to whether RCTs can reasonably be expected in specific cases
(Heymans et al., 2013). The above shows that, although judiciary interference is
often experienced as a negative incident, lawsuits encourage institutional
reflexivity.
The academic debate on health care rationing entails a long-established
discussion about institutional processes, deliberative procedures and technical
approaches (e.g. Daniels and Sabin, 1997; Ham and Roberts, 2003; Klein
and Maybin, 2012). We took an ethnographic approach that focussed on the
working of these processes, procedures and rationality in practice, going back
and forth between principles and policy ideals, and the ‘messiness’ of real-life
decision making (cf. Jenkings and Barber, 2004; Gkeredakis et al., 2011;
Russell and Greenhalgh, 2012, 2014). This type of analysis highlighted a
set of practical issues with EBM that were not directly addressed in court.
We argue that ‘epistemic fairness’ deserves our explicit attention, just as much as
procedural soundness does, if not in court, then at least in academic and policy
circles.
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